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“I didn't use this word „liberation‟ (felszabadulás), 
because in 1956 my life really changed. 
Everybody‟s lives went through a great change, 
but mine especially. …I wasn‟t disgusted with 
myself that I had called the arrival of the Red 
Army in 1945 a liberation, but [after 1956] I didn't 
use it anymore.” 
 
The above respondent came from a middle-class Jewish Budapest family. Members of 
his family had died in the Holocaust after the German occupation of the country in 
March 1944. He experienced the arrival of the Red Army as a „liberation‟ from the 
threat of deportation, and joined the Communist movement immediately after the war. 
Until 1956 he had seen the world in antifascist terms; Fascism was considered to be 
the greatest evil, and Communists the most effective protectors of Hungary from its 
return. In the uprising of 1956, he had supported the reformed Communist forces 
fighting for a democratic socialism; following its suppression by Soviet tanks, he 
vowed to reject his earlier antifascist history: he revised his notion that the Soviets 
had liberated him in 1945 and now cast them as foreign occupiers. When faced with 
major political or social ruptures, individuals may be forced to rethink the meanings 
of their lives. Confronted with new political environments and public narratives about 
the past, individuals may be compelled to reconsider the stories they tell about their 
pasts (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, 2000, pp.16-25; Portelli 2003, pp. 248-76; Mark 
2005a; Dower 1996; Thomson 1998). Life stories that once seemed unproblematic 
might now become politically charged. Narratives that were once public taboos might 
be revived, and need to be reshaped, for public consumption. This article will address 
how one group – Communist party members who joined the movement immediately 
after World War Two and left after 1956 - experienced and reacted to three different 
political systems, and how their private and public autobiographies were moulded in 
response. 
 
Between 1944 and 1948, the Communist parties of central-eastern Europe were 
transformed from politically marginal organisations to mass parties; in Hungary, party 
membership rose from an estimated 3000 to 887,000 (Hanley 2003, p.1076). 
Following the Communist takeover and the imposition of the Soviet Stalinist form of 
Communism, the liberal wing of the party became disillusioned. Their sentiments 
eventually found political expression in the reform national Communism of Imre 
Nagy‟s „New Course‟. Many of those who had backed Nagy found themselves 
supporting, or involved in, the revolution of October 1956, which they viewed as a 
fight for democratic socialism against the Soviet-backed Stalinists in the party. Many 
of those who had identified with the uprising were either expelled or chose not to join 
the reconstituted party after 1956. Party membership collapsed after the uprising; it 
then recovered slowly but at no point before 1989 did it reach the levels of the early 
Communist period. 
 
This generation found themselves living through three distinct political environments, 
in each of which different public narratives about the past were produced. These 
official histories in turn related to, and made political demands on, these individuals‟ 
own lives. The early Communist state before 1956 presented history in terms of the 
antifascist struggle; the recent past was the story of an ongoing and constant battle 
between Communists and the forces of Fascism. After 1956, the Kádár state retained 
this antifascist historical narrative but added a new element: the 1956 uprising was 
understood as the latest clash with reactionary „counter-revolutionaries‟ who were 
intent on restoring Fascism to Hungary. However, by the mid-1960s, as the Kádár 
regime attempted both to stabilise and politically demobilise Hungarian society, so 
politicised versions of the past were increasingly replaced with historical taboos and 
public silences, particularly over the events of 1956. Since the collapse of 
Communism, newly dominant voices have emerged, particularly from a nationalist 
conservative viewpoint. These have attempted to destroy the antifascist perspective on 
the past; Fascism and Communism, rather than being regarded as polar opposites, 
now have their similarities emphasised; both are demonised as periods of totalitarian 
dictatorship and of foreign occupation.  
 
In each of these political periods, individuals from the post-war generation of party 
members have had to consider how to present their own pasts. In private, individuals‟ 
relationships with public narratives were determined both by their past experiences 
and their relationship with the new regime; where individuals supported power, they 
were often prepared to identify with its official histories in their descriptions of their 
own lives, regardless of their own actual past experiences. Yet when these party 
members were in opposition, even if their lives conformed to the descriptions of 
history propagated by the regime, they might choose to reject, or reshape, the telling 
of their own experiences to family or friends. In public too, they had to consider how 
far they wished to identify with public scripts; this was not merely determined by the 
level of support for the regime, but the extent to which the individual wished to be 
seen as politically acceptable in order to avoid discrimination or ensure social 
mobility (Markb 2005; Koleva 2001; Niethammer 1995; Valtchinova, 2000; Kotkin 
1995; Hellbeck 2000 & 2001; Halfin 2003).
 
This was particularly the case in the 
Communist period, where citizens had to produce curricula vitae which laid bare the 
their class position, and relationship to previous regimes and political events; 
individuals had to decide how far they wanted to identify with politically appropriate 
Communist histories in these exercises. For pre-1956 party members, Fascism, Red 
Army „liberation‟ and the 1956 uprising have dominated their public and private 
autobiographical inventions and re-inventions; their understanding of each of these 
has altered significantly in different political contexts, and it is through the changing 
narration of these events that individuals revealed their complex and changing 
relationships with power.  
 
This article uses personal testimony drawn from a broader oral history project, in 
which interviews were conducted with 78 members of the Budapest intelligentsia and 
middle-classes. Interviews covered a wide variety of topics such as attitudes towards 
the Communist state, resistance, social mobility and family life. Interviews were 
unstructured in the first half, but structured with a series of set questions in the 
second; this technique was adopted in order both to give respondents the greatest 
space to frame their lives in their own subjective terms, but also to ensure that a 
sufficient body of comparable material would be produced. The following analysis 
will focus on the testimony of the 13 party members who joined before 1956, and two 
close supporters of the regime, included in the sample. However, it will also draw on 
the remainder of the material, in order to assess the image of the Communist party 
member amongst other social and political groupings. It will suggest that through the 
careful creation and analysis of oral history material, the multiple ways in which 
individuals have constructed their pasts can be uncovered. In some cases, 
interviewees self-consciously described how their understandings of their pasts had 
changed in response to political ruptures. In others, respondents gave different 
answers when asked the same question but in different historical contexts. In other 
instances, a respondent‟s contradictory stories suggested that an event had been 
recounted in various ways at different points in their life, but had not yet been fully 
integrated into a coherent narrative: analysing the points of inconsistency gave clear 
indications of the breaks in past interpretations of their lives.  
 
1944-1956 
Antifascism emerged as a concept across Europe in the mid-1930s in response to the 
rise of Nazism. Many, who opposed the rise of Hitler, put aside other (seemingly less 
significant) political differences and defined themselves simply as antifascist. As 
such, antifascism became an ideology that was capable of uniting a wide swathe of 
the liberal-left (and some moderate conservatives); it became the ideological glue that 
held together disparate political movements in antifascist popular front democratic 
governments both before and after the Second World War (Eley 2002, pp.261-298; 
Rabinbach 1996, pp.3-4; Apor 2000). In the Eastern bloc, however, antifascism was 
used to justify the establishment of a Communist dictatorship after 1948. Communists 
conferred legitimacy on their regime by referring to (and in most cases, exaggerating) 
their role in the antifascist struggle – as partisans and in alliance with the Red Army – 
and bolstered their authority by claiming to be the best protectors of Hungary from the 
return of Fascism (Rév 2005, p.249). The assertion that Fascism needed to be kept at 
bay by the Communist regime was wielded repeatedly in defence of the increasingly 
violent excesses of the regime. Attacks on political opponents, show trials, 
deportations, and eventually the suppression of the supposed reactionary „counter-
revolution‟ of 1956 were all deemed necessary to protect Hungary from the return of 
Fascism. By 1989, therefore, antifascism was no longer remembered as a vibrant 
ideology that had unified the liberal-left against Fascism in defence of democracy, but 
rather as a worn-out rhetoric that had been used to justify dictatorship. When asked 
about antifascism in interviews in post-Communist Hungary, many had forgotten that 
it had had far more positive political connotations in the period before, during and 
immediately after the Second World War; antifascism was associated solely with the 
empty propaganda of the Communist state. Narrators of antifascist stories were not 
viewed sympathetically as victims of fascist atrocities, but rather were charged with 
opportunistically adopting the empty rhetoric of the Communist state for personal 
political advancement. Ernö, a staunch anti-Communist, did not believe the stories 
some individuals told about their liberation (felszabadulás) from Fascism; he refused 
to accept that they had genuinely suffered under Fascism or could possibly have 
welcomed the Red Army as liberators; rather this was the language of the self-
interested grasping Communist functionary:  
 
James :  Did you say ‘liberation’ (‘felszabadulás’)? 
  
Ernö: No (chuckles), for our acquaintances, whenever 
„liberation‟ was mentioned, it was in inverted 
commas. We were „liberated‟ from cars, we were 
„liberated‟ from property, so this was the 
„liberation‟.  
 
James:  So did you ever meet anybody who honestly said, 
‘liberation’ ? 
 
Ernö:  (long pause) Well, I must say no, I must say no. 
(pause) Because all those who spoke openly about 
„liberation‟, in fact had expressed quite different 
opinions only a few months before. For instance a 
friend of mine, we were together at a consulting 
company and we went sailing together with our 
families, and he was a member of our closest 
circle, and we all had the same political views. 
But suddenly he decided that he had greater 
ambitions, so then he joined the party and he 
changed his tone [i.e. starting using the term 
„liberation‟]. He kept complaining about his small 
flat and in no time he found himself in a home in 
Roszadomb
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 and the same autumn his „peace 
bond‟ was drawn and he got some 15, 000 forints 
which at that time, to give you an impression, was 
some fifteen times his monthly secretary and it 
was over two Wartburg cars, so it was a lot of 
money at that time. 
 
Yet some in post-Communist Hungary, especially on the left, did not locate the roots 
of this antifascist „way of seeing‟ in the experience of dictatorship but rather in their 
own „authentic‟ experiences of Fascism and the Second World War. They emphasised 
that no matter how perverted this ideology had become, it once had an authentic core 
which predated the growth of the Communist party or the Communist takeover, and 
lay in the real experience of either suffering under, or the struggle against, the forces 
of Fascism. Mátyás, for example, charted how the suffering of his family as Jews 
under both the German occupation of Hungary and then the subsequent indigenous 
fascist Arrow Cross regime had led a very apolitical family to see themselves in 
political terms, and eventually had led him to career in the Communist party. 
Radicalised by the suffering caused by Fascism, Mátyás, as with many other Jews and 
those on the liberal-left, including non-Communists, searched for a form of politics 
that would prevent Fascism from returning. For some this meant support for the 
antifascist coalition of political parties (including moderate conservatives such as the 
Smallholders‟ Party) which took power in 1945. Mátyás himself was attracted by the 
antifascist claims of the Communist party; hence he joined its youth movement 
MADISz as soon as the war was over. He emphasised that his antifascism was not 
invented after 1948 to ally himself with Communist ideology but was initially 
genuinely grounded in his personal experience of Fascism:  
 
Mátyás:  Now it‟s a terribly politicised society 
(rettenetesen átpolitizált társadalom), and in the 
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 An exclusive suburb in the Buda hills. 
last forty to fifty years the community where I 
have lived…everything and everyone has been 
politicised. This is an abnormal society. Now in 
my childhood it wasn‟t like this, the war brought 
it… in normal circumstances a family doesn‟t talk 
about politics but about sport, food, where the 
boys are, women, cards…Now we were faced 
with a directly life threatening situation from 
1943/4, and already, in this non-political and also 
non-politicised family, politics was becoming the 
main topic of conversation…so how the eastern 
front was moving…the family, as they were not 
Communists, they were afraid of the Russians, but 
at the same time they hoped for their victory… I 
remember March 19
th
 and then the Szálasi putsch 
[the fascist Arrow Cross takeover] on October 15
th
 
really well. I don‟t just remember the events, I 
remember the psychological effects too…we were 
liberated on 12
th
-13
th
 February…I was already 
politicised and in the spring of 1945 I joined 
MADISz [the youth wing of the Communist 
party] of my own free will – nobody invited me. I 
wanted to, and that moment that I decided to join 
was based on a very simple experience. I read in a 
newspaper in Buda that MADISz were tearing 
down the signs from Hitler Square and Mussolini 
Square.
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 And then I thought, that‟s the place for 
me! And slowly life got back to normal, and I 
would have just become a normal student and I 
would have had a normal life, and I wouldn‟t have 
got closer to the Communist movement. Does a 
fifteen-year-old boy search for a political 
movement, if he lives in normal circumstances, if 
he doesn‟t live through a war and if his father 
hasn‟t died in that war? 
 
It was not only Communists who remembered seeing the world in antifascist terms in 
1945. Here Márton, who supported the Smallholders‟ Party in the immediate post-war 
elections, remembered that a wide range of people who had suffered, or struggled, or 
been in opposition under the Horthy system, the German occupation or the fascist 
Arrow Cross regime, had once seen the Red Army as liberators and had supported the 
post-war coalition as a defence against the return of Fascism or an ultra-conservative 
regime: 
 
Marton:  It was a liberation not just for Jews, but for the 
military deserters, who didn‟t want to fight 
alongside Hitler, for the illegal Communists, and 
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 This occurred on 21
st
 January 1945. Later in February, the Communist party suggested that Mussolini 
Square (Oktogon) should be renamed, „Red Army Square‟. This plan was never realised (Mevius 2005, 
p.200)  
also for those who had suffered severely under 
Horthy‟s gendarmes…it was a liberation for 
everyone, who had really suffered under Hitler, or 
hated it, or did not agree with it. It meant the end 
of Hitlerism, it was a liberation from Hitler. 
 
In 1945, antifascism was central to the political beliefs of many in Hungary (Apor, 
2000); a wide swathe of political opinion considered the Horthy era a failure, 
Hungary‟s wartime alliance with Germany as an error, the German occupation and 
Arrow Cross as deeply destructive. Many embraced the Red Army as liberators, and 
supported the post-war „antifascist‟ popular front which promised to protect Hungary 
from Fascism‟s return. István Bibó, writing in 1945, hoped that that the idea of 
antifascist liberation by the Red Army would remain in Hungary despite the fact that 
it occurred amongst the „miseries of a lost war‟. He argued that the success of 
democratic Hungary in the long-term depended on the active and continued rejection 
of Fascism and reactionary social forces: 
 
One thing should be clear: It is crucial for Hungary that the fall 
of the old system remains or comes to be 
considered a liberation, and for the oppressive 
elements of the sick Hungarian social structure 
which disappeared with the arrival of the Red 
Army the hunting aristocrats, the caste bound 
officers and bureaucrats, the gendarmes, and the 
German oriented “educators of nation” to be 
prevented from returning. We must therefore 
make sure that, even if our memory forever 
connects liberation with the varied physical and 
human miseries of a lost war, the same liberation 
shall be made a pure and historical reality for our 
grandchildren because it ushered in a long series 
of developments with positive consequences. It is 
crucial for Hungary that the liberating 
achievement of the Soviet army not be forgotten 
but preserve its significance for Hungary‟s 
democratic development (Bibó 1991, p.91). 
 
Yet, by the late 1940s, the antifascist way of viewing the world had become 
problematic. Many replaced their view of the Red Army as liberators with a 
characterisation of the Soviet army as an occupying force which helped establish a 
Communist dictatorship. Moreover, the use of antifascist rhetoric in Communist 
propaganda to legitimate their new regime tainted antifascist sentiments and 
weakened their association with the popular enthusiasm for the Red Army liberation 
from Fascism which had been felt immediately after the war. Csaba had supported 
„bourgeois parties‟ such as the Smallholders‟ after 1945. He had seen the Red Army 
initially as his liberators, celebrated an end to Fascism and the „reactionary‟ elements 
of Hungarian society, but wanted a multi-party liberal democracy. With the 
beginnings of Communist dictatorship, and the state‟s instrumentalisation of 
antifascist rhetoric, he found himself rejecting his own, and his friends‟ experiences of 
antifascism and the liberating Red Army: 
 James: Did you meet anybody who thought that 1945 was 
a liberation? 
 
Csaba: Loads of people used to say it…..they used to call 
these events a liberation……But in France there is 
an idea of liberation that remained after the war 
(háború utáni felszabadulás). Here there isn‟t, 
because they [the Communists] changed the street 
names to Liberation Boulevard and Liberation 
Square. They don‟t say this word „liberation‟ now, 
because now it is connected with the Russians. 
 
Many Hungarians thus abandoned antifascism; some continued using its terminology 
in public in order to ensure their education or employment under the Communist 
system, but from this point onwards most privately considered it to be an inauthentic 
way of seeing the world. Only those who supported the Communist state stuck with 
their antifascist life stories in public and private, instrumentalising them in different 
ways to express a variety of responses to the Communist state. They did not only 
parrot state narratives of the „antifascist struggle‟ and „liberation‟ in order to succeed 
in the party; alongside this purpose, antifascist narratives were also wielded as tools to 
express genuine ideological support for the regime, or even resistance to its excesses.  
  
In the first instance, antifascist stories were retained because respondents had, at least 
in the first years of the regime, a faith in the ability of the Communist party to 
transform Hungary into a genuine antifascist democracy that would protect Hungary 
from the return of reactionary politics. Here Jenő described how he had joined the 
party at the point at which he felt post-war democracy was under threat from right-
wing conspiracy: 
  
Jenő:  I sympathised with the Communist movement as an anti-
Nazi movement before 1945. Because they were the most 
radical fighters against the war, against Nazi ambitions. 
But then immediately after 1945 I didn‟t identify with the 
movement, as they employed artificial nationalistic 
propaganda, and there were still others in the popular 
independence front I liked. At the same time I could see 
that their literature and culture was rather unsophisticated 
from a political point of view. I didn‟t like this, so I 
didn‟t join immediately, in contrast to many of my 
comrades...then later in 1947 when on one hand the 
Hungarian right-wing began to organise themselves once 
again in the so called ‟conspiracy‟ 3, and on the other had 
a very powerful voice in the 1947 election... So then in 
1947 I decided to join the Communist party.  
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 This refers to fears on the left, which were exaggerated by the Communists for political advantage, 
that the right were planning to undermine the fragile post-war democracy with an „anti-republican 
conspiracy‟. It was used by the Communists as a pretext to arrest the first secretary of the 
Smallholders‟ Party, Béla Kovács, in February 1947. 
Ágota, who joined the party in 1951, continued to frame her world in antifascist terms 
after 1948, abandoning them only in 1956 when she concluded that the Communist 
state had betrayed its initial promise. Up until that point, she was happy to use 
antifascist vocabulary both at home and at work, as long as she believed that 
Communists were protecting Hungary from Fascism and ensuring a progressive 
transformation of the country (even if she was disillusioned at certain points). She had 
naturalised anti-fascism so completely that she did not recognise that many others did 
not call it a liberation after 1948; she believed that it was only „comrades of Szálasi‟ 
(i.e. Fascists) who rejected this term: 
 
James:  After 1948 did you use this word liberation?  
 
Ágota: I used it, because everybody used it, and so really 
it became automatic. When I got my job, there we 
used it…the word simply meant that the Germans 
were defeated and all was well… 
 
James: But many thought that this was not a liberation… 
 
Ágota: They only changed their minds later – I could not 
believe that anyone, except for Fascists, wouldn‟t 
feel that it was a liberation…Everybody, even my 
acquaintances, friends and my relatives who were 
sympathetic to Germany felt this, only later in 
1956 when things degenerated [did this change]. 
Then and there everybody was glad about the 
victory over the Germans, except for those 
comrades of Szálasi. 
 
For some party members, enthusiastic support for the regime meant not only the 
continuation of antifascist stories but also their supplementation with new ones 
supplied by the Communist state. Miklós, for example, had joined the party in the 
early 1950s. He continued to narrate his experiences of suffering under Fascism and 
his liberation by the Soviets, now weaving these experiences into a much more 
complex antifascist narrative that must also have been the product of his political 
experiences as a party member. His story echoed much more closely later Communist 
versions of antifascism which did not just celebrate the struggle against the Arrow 
Cross, Nazi Germany and the Horthy system (a celebration which many non-
Communists had also joined in 1945), but demonised all the Communists‟ later 
enemies as Fascists, intent on destroying the Communist state, regardless of their 
actual ideology. Thus groups such as the Smallholders‟ party (who were part of the 
antifascist collation after the war) or the revolutionaries of 1956 were also now 
demonised as anti-Semitic Fascists. The Communist state‟s institutionalisation of 
antifascism had clearly given his experiences a home after 1948, but it had also given 
him lots of new material with which to construct a party loyalist‟s antifascist account 
of his life. These ideas were still repeated in post-Communist testimony: 
 
James :  So what were your attitudes towards the 
Communists? 
 
Miklós:  Even if I had been in England, I would have been 
antifascist. And we thought that the Communist 
party were the best among the antifascists … The 
Russians were fighting the Germans, they killed 
the Germans and they liberated us…But as I told 
you, I saw one rape, not a rape case, one girl came 
out, not even crying, [whispers in the girl‟s voice] 
„Yes, yes, pardon me mummy, he made love to 
me. He was so young and even so so 
experienced‟. She was an intelligent girl. And of 
course…the Jews in ‟56, the Fascists in Hungary 
accused the Jews of all being 
Communists…Because in the villages there were 
lots of pogroms and they killed the Jews because 
they thought they were on the side of the 
Communists…after the war I voted for the 
Smallholders‟, but later they became fascist.4 It 
was a problem. The Smallholders‟…..we felt that 
certain politicians in the past [who were 
fascist]….now they joined the Smallholders‟ 
Party. … as I told you, I worked for the Russian 
army… and I had to write [signs] in Russian „this 
street is examined and there are no mines‟. In 
Russian...And I got food there. Lots of food. 
Because I worked there. There were many 
intelligent Russian officers as well. So not every 
Russian had blood on his hands. They were 
humans.  
  
Many respondents realised after 1948 that their antifascist outlook, now 
institutionalised by the state, was being used on a everyday basis to judge access to 
education, the workplace and the party. To be on the right or wrong side of the 
antifascist struggle could determine one‟s access to university, promotion or financial 
support, or determine the level of discrimination one might suffer by the state. 
Producing politically appropriate curricula vitae was a vital skill for those wishing to 
avoid discrimination or fulfil their ambition. Party members, alongside all Communist 
citizens, had to learn how to fit their life stories into required Communists templates if 
they wished to be successful (Mark 2005b). This may explain some of the later polish 
of Communist party members‟ antifascist life stories: Miklós‟ insistence that he 
worked for the Red Army, and his explaining away of his Smallholders‟ party 
membership by claiming he left as soon they became „fascist‟ may have been 
narrative echoes of the sort of stories he had to emphasise in order to construct a 
politically advantageous autobiography. Indeed, Miklós became the headmaster of a 
school at a very young age, a position that he would not have arrived in if he had not 
known how to present his past to the state in an acceptable fashion. Antifascist 
autobiographies might often have been maintained, or refined, in order to achieve 
ambitions in the early Communist period.  
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 This was an echo of Communist propaganda in early 1947, when they accused the Smallholders‟ 
Party of helping to organise an „anti-republican conspiracy‟ to undermine post-war democracy and 
impose a „reactionary‟ social order.  
 Antifascist life stories were not only the products of support for, or ambition under, 
the Communist state; they could also be used to express resistance. Antifascism 
played a vital role in shaping the resistance against Stalinism, both in the lead-up and 
during the 1956 revolution. Many party members, by the early 1950s, had become 
disillusioned with the practice of the Stalinist state under Rákosi following the show 
trials, excessive violence against the regime‟s enemies, the rigidly imposed Stalinist 
economic model and the subordination of Hungarian national interests to those of the 
Soviet Union. Alajos, who was a close supporter of what would come to be known as 
„reform socialism‟, charted this change in his life: 
 
James :   So can you remember how your opinion 
changed? 
 
Alajos : … between ‟48 and let‟s say „50-‟51, I still kept a 
kind of open and very positive attitude towards the 
regime, and then, but already in ‟51 I decided that 
I would never join the Communist Party because, 
well, we went to a party meeting where an old 
social democrat was kicked out, and the 
circumstances was so humiliating and so 
disgusting and I thought, okay, that‟s out, I 
mean…..but it was still a period … if somebody 
asked me whether I was a socialist, I would say, I 
was a socialist, until about (pause) ‟52 or ‟53.  
 
Despite growing dissatisfaction and horror at the practices of the state most, however, 
did not resist Stalinism until provided with a positive socialist alternative. Indeed, 
disillusionment with the Stalinist realities lead many to withdraw from the political 
sphere. Many were galvanised by into expressing resistance only when new hope for 
reform emerged after Stalin‟s death, and a new leadership in Moscow insisted that the 
Rákosi‟s Stalinist clique be replaced by a less hard-line government. In July 1953, a 
reformist leadership under Imre Nagy began their „New Course‟, a programme which 
advocated a more flexible approach to the agricultural and industrial sectors, an end to 
the arbitrariness of political persecution and an attempt to gain a limited popular 
legitimacy (Rainer 1999). This revitalized many socialists‟ faith in the possibilities of 
Communism: Alajos found his views crystallising into this Nagy-led „reform socialist 
mode‟. Thus reinvigorated by the possibility of fighting for a more democratic form 
of Communism, these respondents were now prepared to resist the attempted re-
imposition of hard-line Stalinism when Rákosi mounted a political comeback in 
spring 1955. 
 
Alajos :  I almost had a split personality, until about mid-
„53, when my views crystallised into a reform 
socialist mode, a sort of critical reformist attitude 
within the terms of socialism.…And then 1953, 
after Imre Nagy‟s new programme, a lot of us, my 
generation, were quite enthusiastic about it, and 
when Rákosi and the Stalinists tried to come back 
in ‟55, then we weren‟t intimidated and spoke out 
in various ways against it and tried to do 
something. 
 
Reformist respondents described how from 1953, they were increasingly able to 
engage in open debates about Stalinism and its alternatives within the party. Alajos 
represented the clashes that occurred between reformists and Stalinists in his Marxist-
Leninist seminars at university and illustrated his preparedness to criticise Stalinists 
who used antifascism in an unquestioning fashion to demonise their enemies in the 
West: 
 
… So I was talking about these classes in 
Marxism-Leninism: there was this huge 
auditorium, and the man who spoke couldn‟t see 
the back where we were playing cards. They were 
such primitive lectures …But one wouldn‟t argue 
with them. Sometimes, it happened once in a 
Marxist-Leninist exam that the examiners weren‟t 
quite sure whether I was right or not. …. And the 
question was whether – “What do you think – Is 
America becoming more fascist?”…. And I had 
just read in the party paper that the American high 
court actually ruled against segregation, and it was 
the first time they ruled against southern 
segregated states, and I said, no I don‟t believe it‟s 
getting more fascist, I mean, I‟ve just read in the 
papers that there was a decision, in favour of 
blacks, so whoever says that, is ridiculous. 
Because you see, one of the Stalinist tenets was 
that the class war is getting sharper all the time, so 
if you had reformist thinking, you immediately 
challenged that view. And you‟d say, “It can‟t be 
true, because there would have been a war, if the 
class war had come, there would have been a 
revolution, there would be war, it can‟t be true!”  
 
Antifascism played a role in the articulation of differences between Stalinists and 
reform Communists. Alajos highlighted how, in Marxist-Leninist seminars, Stalinists 
had appealed to an overly politicised unrealisitic, „inauthentic‟ antifascism. They 
always needed to invent new fascist enemies, or present the conflict between Fascists 
and their enemies in ever sharper terms, regardless of present realities, in order to 
justify their own power. This perceived abuse of the memory of the antifascist 
struggle did not lead reformists to reject it as a world-view; rather they appealed to 
their own separate memory of it in order to attack Stalinism.  
 
Alajos remembered using antifascist rhetoric against the state in his protests in 1956. 
He had found himself involved in the demonstration which followed the reburial of 
Rajk on 6 October 1956. László Rajk, who had been the Communist Interior minister, 
was sentenced at a show trial on trumped-up charges of Trotksyism and espionage in 
the summer of 1949 and later executed; his death became a symbol for the perversions 
of Stalinism and his reburial thus became a magnet for reform Communists. Alajos 
recalled transforming the meaning of old antifascist slogans, and a well-known 
antifascist poem, into attacks on Stalinists: 
 
 
Alajos :  on 6 October 1956 you had the Rajk 
Reburial…when I was coming out after the 
speeches…I saw a little group with a flag and they 
were sort of beckoning to me to join in. I joined 
in, and then I found somebody…a bloke I knew 
from the Széchényi library who said, „Somebody 
told me there‟s going to be a demonstration‟. 
„Where are you going to?‟ „Oh, we‟re going to 
Hősök Tere [Heroes‟ Square], and then to the 
Batthyány Örökmécses.‟ This is a flame in 
memory of Lajós Batthyány who was the Prime 
Minister of Hungary in 1849, and was executed.
5
 
This is a kind of place where people go, sort of a 
„Martyrs‟ Corner‟. All right, so I joined the group. 
It wasn‟t particularly political, but we started 
producing slogans together…between 1945 and 
1948, the Communist party slogan was: „We‟re 
not going to stop half-way. Let reaction perish!‟ 
So we adapted this slogan, instead of saying 
„reaction‟ saying „Stalinism‟, so „We are not going 
to stop half-way. Let Stalinism perish!‟ And then 
we shouted over and over, two hundred people, as 
we marched with this flag, and people looked at 
us, and they didn‟t understand what was going 
on…I read out a poem by Atilla József,6 which 
was antifascist, rather anti-German, and was a 
patriotic poem ending with the words, „So that we 
shouldn‟t be a German colony‟, but I read, „So we 
shouldn‟t be a foreign colony‟. 
 
Alajos had seen himself as part of the antifascist tradition which had struggled against 
Nazism and „reaction‟ in the immediate post-war period; he believed that this gave 
him the right to resist Stalinism. By using the antifascist themes of fighting against 
occupation, political extremism and violent dictatorship, reformists thus turned its 
language back against the excesses of the Stalinist state. In this way, antifascism 
could be employed to express resistance to the state.  
 
Most respondents viewed the 1956 uprising as part of their struggle against the 
Stalinists in the party, and as an attempt to replace a corrupted state with a democratic 
socialist state which held to antifascist ideals. Benedek produced revolutionary 
leaflets in Russian and distributed them to the first wave of Soviet tanks as they 
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arrived in Budapest. Worried that the soldiers might view the insurgents as Fascists 
intent on destroying Communism, he sought to reclaim antifascism for the 
revolutionaries, by explaining to the Russians that they were sincere antifascists, who 
merely wanted a more humane form of socialism. His involvement in 1956 revealed 
the extent to which he continued to view the world in antifascist terms: he viewed the 
those others in the revolution who were fighting to restore capitalism as „unrealistic‟ 
Fascists:  
 
Benedek:  The ‟56 revolution was just about which of the 
left-wing options we take. There was no-one, 
except for a few, unrealistic people, who were 
dreaming of restoring capitalism, but the 
revolution of all those who took part was always 
just about which of the various possibilities of 
socialism we take… We decided that we would 
try to explain to the Russian soldiers who we 
were; that we were not Fascists trying to re-
establish capitalism or Nazism or anything like 
that. So we wrote a one-page leaflet in Russian 
and took it to the university printing press, where I 
had a friend, a printer friend, and he printed it for 
me, and then with other friends in my circle, we 
went around in the whole of Budapest and 
climbed up on the tanks and handed the soldiers 
these leaflets. It said that we wanted democratic 
socialism, not capitalism, and we want equality 
between nations, of friendship with the Russian 
nation on basis of equality… this was the first day 
of the revolution… so the leaflet was quite a mild 
document if you like. We didn‟t dream of leaving 
the Warsaw Pact. 
 
The growth of the antifascist life story did not reflect, as it is frequently imagined in 
post-Communist Hungary, the preparedness of Communist functionaries to invent 
antifascist pasts in order to succeed within the political system. Ambition under 
Communism was only one root of the this story. For many, antifascism had genuine 
pre-Communist roots in their experiences of Fascism during World War Two. After 
1948, antifascist narratives were used by party members to express range of 
relationships with the Communist state; these included not only support and ambition, 
but also resistance. However, faced with the defeat of their attempt to reform 
socialism in the revolution of October 1956, and their alienation from the party and 
state which followed it, many respondents no longer wanted a politically engaged life. 
Neither wanting to express support or resistance towards the new post-1956 state, 
their antifascist life stories no longer had a reason to exist: new ways of seeing the 
world, and framing of their lives, began to develop. 
 
1956-1989 
In the aftermath of the defeat of the 1956 revolution, the reconstituted state under 
Kádár pronounced the events of October to have been a „counter-revolution‟ 
organised by Fascists to undermine Communist rule. They exaggerated and 
caricatured the presence of the radical right and conservative Catholic wings of the 
revolution in order to characterise the entire uprising as an attempt to restore Fascism 
to Hungary (Berecz, 1986); the existence of other political tendencies – reformed 
socialist and national-democratic – was ignored. Thus those reformed Communists 
who were involved in the revolution now found themselves demonised as counter-
revolutionary Fascists. This remained the official version of the 1956 until the late 
1980s; the uprising was the last in a long series of attempts by Fascists to take power 
in Hungary (Rév 2000; Ripp 2002). 
 
Those respondents who rejoined, or supported, the reconstituted party after 1956 still 
produced „counter-revolutionary‟ accounts even in a post-Communist context.7 Judit 
came from a Jewish family and had joined the party in 1945 aged thirteen (lying about 
her date of birth). She had left in 1954, had wanted to re-join after 1956, but felt 
unable actively to contribute to the party, because of her domestic responsibilities. 
Her husband had rejoined after 1956 (and remained in the party until the 1980s). She 
wrote her own family experiences of the uprising into the Kádárist interpretation of 
the 1956 revolution. Her family had suffered anti-Semitic abuse during the revolution; 
she used these experiences in order to characterise those involved in the uprising as 
Fascists, and to explain why she welcomed the arrival of Soviet tanks. The framing of 
her own experiences at the hands of so-called „counter-revolutionaries‟ was a product 
of her support for the Kádár state: 
 
James :  So before 1956, were you often afraid? 
 
Judit :  I don't remember [being afraid]. But on October 
23rd ‟56, the first day, my mother was working 
near the Stalin statue and she came home by foot. 
On the first day she was attacked on the street as a 
Jew. There came a group and they spat on my 
mother, saying, „you ugly Jew!‟ And after that we 
were glad we were living near to the Russian 
embassy, on Bajza Utca and that Russian tanks 
were there, because an anti-Semitic movement 
was taking shape underground … We felt more 
secure with the Russians. But is an absolutely 
Jewish point of view. Absolutely. I don't know 
whether the others felt the same but… Hearsay. 
That the Fascists are moving against the Jews 
again…But a lot of Jews left the country [in the 
emigration during and after the 1956 uprising], not 
only because of Communism, but also because 
they were afraid that something could begin again. 
 
James : Most people say the opposite about the Russian 
tanks. 
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Judit: Yes, I can imagine. I know. It is my personal 
view. 
 
James: So can you remember what you thought when the 
Russian tanks came in? 
 
Judit: It‟s a difficult question to answer. My feeling was 
that we were more secure, but I don't know how to 
explain it after so many years.  
 
James: … What did you say about ’56 itself? 
 
Judit: You know, nowadays, people say that they were 
heroes in „56, when I know for certain that they 
were nothing, they had nothing to do with ‟56. It 
was the very same thing that after the war, in 
Hungary, loads of people claimed to be partisans. 
But during the war there weren‟t really any. And it 
is the very same thing. Nowadays they are saying 
they are heroes of ‟56, when there were not so 
many of them. 
 
The experience of the uprising did not challenge Judit‟s antifascist framing of her life 
story. Her family had been saved from the Holocaust by the Red Army and Soviet 
tanks were rescuing her once again from a Fascist attack in 1956. Her experience of 
the suppression of the revolution confirmed her belief in the Communists as 
antifascists and the Russians as her liberators. The story of 1956 was placed right at 
the centre of her life story in the Kádár period; her support for the new regime was 
based on her memory of being saved from renewed persecution. 
 
Many did not re-join the Communist movement after 1956. Membership of the party, 
which had stood at 859,037 in January 1956 before the revolution (Rákosi 1974, pp. 
224-5), fell to 151,000 in its immediate aftermath and had only risen to 416,646 by 
1959 (Szenes 1976, pp.249-50). It was only in the 1980s that party membership began 
to approach pre-1956 levels (Hanley 2003, p.1076). Many respondents presented the 
debates which surrounded their decisions not to rejoin. Mátyás had been a reform 
Communist, identified with Imre Nagy, had supported the revolution and was 
dismayed by its collapse. His decision not to rejoin was a moral one: he now saw the 
party as inauthentic as it had crushed its own supporters. He caricatured the 
reconstituted party as a broken organisation with an ideologically inauthentic 
membership:  
 
James :  Did you think of rejoining the party? 
 
Mátyás:  After 1956, it wasn‟t any kind of temptation at all, 
because by the 4
th
 November 1956 the situation 
had been resolved morally; we were only really 
thinking about whether to stay in Hungary or to 
emigrate. But not to join the party was, for my 
wife and my friends, a completely clear moral 
imperative, we had no doubts about it…there were 
many who joined and many who didn‟t. Some 
joined because they thought it was a counter-
revolution, or because they were true believers 
(meggyőződéses kommunisták). And some thought 
that they had to join the party because there was 
no other possibility of ensuring their survival…it 
really pulled apart our community where I lived, 
us young Budapest left-wing intellectuals. Still, 
there were those, who up until 1956 had not been 
party members, and in 1957 everyone joined the 
party, because at that point the party had 
collapsed, and they thought that here was the 
opportunity to join and make their careers. There 
was a concrete example, a very unpleasant monk, 
who had never been in the party, and when they 
reconstituted the party he immediately joined, 
because no kind of conditions were set. 
  
Respondents who supported the Kádár state, such as Judit, found their pre-1956 
antifascist stories confirmed by the experience of the uprising. However, for 
respondents such as Mátyás above, who broke with the party after the defeat of the 
uprising, and viewed the Kádár state as a bastardised inauthentic Communism, their 
antifascist life stories were thrown into crisis. They were faced with a state that called 
their attempt to reform socialism a counter-revolution, the suppression of the 
revolution the „second liberation of Hungary‟ and found themselves demonised as 
Fascists. This change in the public narrative provoked a crisis in his private 
understanding of antifascism; no longer able to support the state, seeing left-wing 
colleagues violently treated, and even executed, for Fascist „counter-revolutionary‟ 
activities, he began to question whether the antifascist framing of his life up until this 
point had been a sham. Despite having been saved from extermination as a Jew by the 
Red Army in early 1945, he started to wonder whether he had in fact been liberated 
by their arrival. The experience of a bastardised official antifascist narrative after 
1956 therefore provoked many to question or abandon the antifascist stories through 
which they had made sense of their lives before 1956: 
 
James: Did you use this word ‘liberation’? 
 
Mátyás: Naturally, absolutely. It was an everyday saying, 
that 1945 was a liberation. There wasn‟t another 
word other than liberation for it in 1944-5.  
 
James: How have you used the word ‘liberation’ since the 
collapse of Communism? 
 
…already [in 1956] it became a confusing word as 
the consequence of the so-called Liberation was 
the destruction of the 1956 revolution…when the 
propaganda started on the 4
th
 November 1956 that 
the destruction of the revolution was the „second 
Liberation of Hungary‟ – and I‟m not 
exaggerating here - from that second onwards I 
didn't consider 1945 a liberation anymore. 
Because in that second, in 1956, we woke up the 
fact that the Soviets were attacking the city and 
we didn't feel that they were liberating troops 
anymore. It is complicated. Or it is very simple. 
Probably both. At Christmas 1944 when the 
Russians came and saved my and my mother‟s 
lives, was it not a liberation? What the hell was it, 
if it wasn‟t a liberation? That‟s all. I don‟t have 
anything more to say about it. 
 
Before 1956, antifascism had been used to express both support and resistance to the 
state. As Mátyás‟ testimony above suggests, ex-party members‟ alienation from the 
state meant that they were not prepared to deploy their antifascist stories in order to 
identify with the state anymore. However, there were alternative readings of 
antifascism which might have been deployed in the service of resistance to the Kádár 
regime. During the revolution itself, reformist party members had seen themselves as 
the authentic antifascists who had once opposed Hitlerism in order to ensure a 
democratic political order, and were now fighting against the Stalinist perversion of 
antifascism in order to establish a reformed, more humane and democratic socialism. 
This alternative reading of antifascism had inspired resistance before and during the 
1956 uprising; in the period immediately after the revolution some respondents still 
sought to recall an alternative version of socialism that could be fought for: their 
memory of 1956 as a heroic struggle suggested the possibility of continued resistance 
against an inauthentic state: 
 
James : Directly after the revolution, what was your 
opinion of Kádár? 
 
Jenő :  Bad...it was the worst possible, I hated the Kádár 
system, because they compromised socialist 
principles, because they forced a new socialist 
system onto people with tanks. We regarded it as a 
catastrophe. From that perspective we considered 
it to be the greatest misfortune, that socialist 
theories, principles, had been compromised.  
 
However, as the opportunities and desire for resistance declined under the Kádár 
regime, so did the antifascist versions of history that had once framed and justified it. 
The retribution which followed the revolution convinced many that resistance against 
the re-established Kádár state was futile, and that the newly reconstituted Communist 
state was incapable of being reformed. Between 1957 and 1963, around 350 
revolutionaries were executed and 22,000 sentenced for their involvement in the 
revolution; overall, it is estimated that over 100,000 were affected to some degree by 
the post-1956 reprisals (Litván 1996, pp.143-4). Alongside armed youths who fought 
in street battles, and members of workers‟ councils set up during and after the 
revolution, the left-wing intelligentsia interviewed in this project suffered 
disproportionately compared to the population as a whole (Litván 1996, pp.144-6). 
For these ex-party members, 1956 increasingly represented the futility of resistance, 
the tragedy of the reprisals, and the end of their aspirations for reformed socialism. In 
this quote, Imre rejected the portrayal of the revolution as a heroic fight; rather, by the 
1960s, he saw it as an „unwanted revolution‟, which had radicalised the state into 
violence against the reformers, and had in fact destroyed the possibility of a reformed 
ideologically authentic Communist state. For him, the memory of 1956 did not act as 
a call for resistance but rather was an illustration of the pointlessness of opposition. 
This new memory of 1956 – as an unwanted destructive event - was thus increasingly 
being used to justify a withdrawal from active political engagement with, and 
resistance against, the Kádár state. He remembered that this attitude was particularly 
prevalent within his circle in 1968, when debates about the pointlessness of resistance 
were revived in the wake of the failures of Czech reformers in the Prague Spring: 
 
James :  A simple question. Why did you want to take part 
in the revolution? 
 
Imre:  I didn‟t want to take part in the revolution. The 
revolution came upon us, it was a spontaneous 
revolution. Even the devil wouldn‟t have wanted a 
revolution, we wanted reform, but without an 
armed uprising. And on October 23
rd
 when the 
revolution spontaneously broke out, you had to 
decide, whether to stand with the revolution or 
not. And it was the opinion of my circle of friends 
that we had to stand with the revolutionaries, and 
in the course of the revolution we had to solve the 
economic problems of the country. So already 
then there was no going back. 
 
James:  How did this feeling develop? 
 
Imre:   Firstly, this feeling was a question of 
moral and political development: our knowledge 
of what had happened in the west, and of western 
democracy, got stronger, and at the same time our 
knowledge of the awful things that had happened 
in the Soviet Union also developed. And in 1968, 
there were the Czech reforms which didn’t lead to 
an armed uprising, but were put down in the same 
brutal way, as the Hungarians had been in 1956. 
So at that time we had debates with lots of people 
about why the Soviet bloc wasn‟t able to manage 
to take another course. It was because reform had 
been strangled by the armed uprising, it had been 
strangled by the Köztársaság Square lynchings
8
, 
and Imre Nagy taking Hungary out of the Warsaw 
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 On 30
th
 October 1956, an armed assault on the party‟s headquarters on Köztársaság Square led to 
lynchings and the deaths of twenty-four people who were guarding the building; after 1956, the state 
presented these victims as martyrs at the hands of Fascists: this story became one of the main 
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Pact. The suppression of the Czech reforms 
confirmed my view of 1956.  
 
The revolution and its aftermath had thus destroyed their antifascist framing of their 
lives. They could neither identify with the Kádár-era version of antifascism which had 
demonised them as „counter-revolutionary‟ Fascists, nor, after the experience of the 
post-revolutionary reprisals, did they wish to resist the state. Thus antifascism, which 
had previously been central to the dialogue between party member and state, no 
longer had relevance to their lives: they no longer wished to engage politically either 
as supporters or resistors. 
 
Respondents revealed how their withdrawal from political engagement developed 
through the 1960s. The very politicised accounts of their lives between 1944 and 1958 
suddenly disappeared from their life narratives; stories of persecution under Fascism, 
revolution in 1956 and repression suddenly gave way to descriptions of career and 
family:  
 
James:  What happened later [after the revolution]? 
 
Károly :  I was arrested 10-12 days after I was initially set 
free, then in 1957 they let me out again…when 
they took me and then released me, with a friend‟s 
help I managed to get a one-room flat in Újpest 
which didn‟t have a toilet or bathroom, had water 
only in the courtyard, but nevertheless was an 
apartment. We began to live there, there our fourth 
child was born, the slowly things settled down and 
I became a deputy director in 1965. That was the 
period of consolidation in Hungary, and in 1971 I 
became the director… then things were getting 
back to normal.  
 
Respondents described the two processes that led them to withdraw politically. 
Firstly, the experience of retribution had convinced many that they could neither 
support the state nor was there any point resisting it; hence they decided to withdraw 
from a political life. Secondly, the policies of the Kádár state which followed the 
period of retribution from 1962 onwards – in the so-called „consolidation period‟ – 
offered individuals who had fought in 1956 the possibility of re-integration, if they 
were prepared to refrain from further political opposition. From 1962, the Communist 
state ended the open persecution of so-called „counter-revolutionaries‟; in August of 
that year the party‟s central committee resolved to terminate political trials for 
involvement in the uprising. Many of those sentenced in 1957-8 were amnestied in 
1963. Moreover, those who had initially opposed the Kádár state were now not 
merely tolerated on the social margins, but actively encouraged to re-integrate into 
society as long as they remained apolitical.
9
 In December 1961, Kádár famously 
declared that, “he who is not against us is with us and welcomed by us”. After the 
„great amnesty‟ of 1963 for those sentenced in 1957-8, the children of „56-ers were 
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 From this point many members of the intelligentsia and old middle classes (from whom this sample of 
party members is taken) began to recover the social position they had lost in the early Communist 
period (Rainer 2005, pp.66-7; Valuch 2001, p.99; Gáti & Horváth, 1992). 
increasingly allowed back into education (although their exclusion from tertiary 
education declined much more slowly) (Kőrösi & Molnár 2003, pp. 64-5). Nearly all 
respondents accepted this offer to re-integrate on the condition that they withdrew 
from the political sphere. It was not considered a betrayal of their earlier political 
lives; rather, it paralleled their own attempts to depoliticise themselves after the defeat 
of the revolution.
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These respondents were now living politically withdrawn lives; the protection of their 
careers and the private sphere from outside interference replaced a political dialogue 
with the Communist state as their central concern. Some decided to „tame‟ their 
political pasts; they neither wanted to politicise their children through the memory of 
antifascism or resistance, nor did they want their former political pasts to impact on 
their careers.
11
 Kádár-era autobiographies were often designed in order to insulate the 
individual and their family from politics and to ensure a prosperous apolitical life. 
Indeed, any manipulation of their pasts was acceptable as long as it protected the 
private sphere. Some, for example, chose to silence, or depoliticise, their political life 
stories in the private sphere, whilst continuing to use antifascist life stories in public, 
in order to safeguard their careers or avoid discrimination.
12
 
 
Károly had set up a new reformed socialist party in his locality in October 1956, had 
contact with Imre Nagy, had been faced with execution but had been spared. Despite 
this earlier revolutionary life, he was silent about 1956 wherever this was possible: he 
claimed only to have talked about it once in the entire Kádár period. His children had 
been aware that their father had been under political surveillance. Not wanting to 
radicalise them, however, he refrained from telling them about what had happened to 
him until the late 1980s : 
 
James :  Did you talk later with your family or friends 
about 1956? 
 
Károly:  There was a classmate of mine who I had 
graduated with and we were on especially good 
terms with, and in 1963 – by that time I was 
already 37 - we went out for a two-day walking 
holiday, and there I told him everything. He 
listened with dismay – he was the first [I told]… 
Otherwise I never really brought it up.  
 
No, it was an interesting thing, at just about the 
time when the system changed [in 1989], my 
children reproached me, that they had never 
known anything about what had happened to me, 
it was not a subject we had discussed at home. 
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 Silencing of the past was not a feature of all respondents‟ testimony; however, nearly all respondents 
took care to protect their social position from the intrusion of past political actions.  
 
When I was set free from the prison, for years a 
car stood outside my home every night…even 
with this going on we never talked about it, but 
they were small children. Even much later it 
wasn‟t a subject for discussion - even when things 
settled down [in the 1970s] - my children always 
knew there was something, but it was not a subject 
for discussion. Then in 1987/88, when they were 
already adults, and had families, then they asked 
what was what.  
 
When he could not avoid dealing with 1956, he devised strategies to minimise the 
impact that his past would have on his family. He formulated a twin policy of silence 
at home and openness at work; he would not use the term revolution at home for fear 
that his children would start using the word and incriminate themselves; at work, by 
contrast, he was open about his active revolutionary role in curricula vitae which he 
filled out for employment and promotion; by being honest about his past he hoped to 
appear to be demonstrating sufficient obedience to avoid further retribution:  
 
James :  What was your opinion of this phrase, ‘counter-
revolution’? 
 
Károly:  I never used it, it was a very delicate issue. When 
I spoke I always said the „October events‟ 
(október események), or the „events of 1956‟. I 
didn‟t use the term revolution, I wouldn‟t have 
dared, because they kicked those sort of people 
out, but I never referred to it as a counter-
revolution… It was a kind of compromise [to use 
this term, the „October events‟], but it meant my 
past never affected my children. I never put them 
in the position where they could be provoked [i.e. 
into saying something politically problematic]…, 
officially I wrote about my role [in 1956] 
everywhere I had to, so they [the state] knew 
about me, because I wrote it in my autobiography, 
what had happened, because I didn‟t want the 
facts coming out from elsewhere. 
 
Similar pressures to protect one‟s present from one‟s history also shaped the new 
ways in which the stories of Red Army liberation were told. Before 1956 their use of 
liberation stories in both private and public was illustrative of their identification with 
the state. By the mid-1960s, however, some respondents were merely manipulating 
liberation stories wherever necessary in order to ensure that family and career were 
protected from outside intrusions. In private, most had abandoned the idea, following 
their political alienation from the regime. Despite this, they continued to use it in 
public to maintain their careers:  
 
James:  When did the use of the word ‘liberation’ change? 
 
Ágota: For me, after 1956 it slowly began to change, 
because my husband in 1955 had already been 
chucked out [of the party]…myself, I was already 
calling it a megszállás (occupation). 
 
James: Did you use it after 1956? 
 
Ágota: In teaching absolutely, if I wanted to keep my job. 
It was that kind of word like „table‟ or „drink‟- it 
was one word that meant, that here the Russians 
had defeated the Germans. But for me the word no 
longer had any political content – this is still true 
today. 
 
After 1989, this preparedness to manipulate one‟s life story in public was seen as a 
sign of a collaborator. However, for these individuals, this issue was not discussed in 
moral terms; it was neither seen as a form of compromise, nor as a betrayal of their 
older political struggles. Respondents did not view these historical revisions as 
morally problematic both because they saw themselves as politically (and thus 
morally) disengaged, and because the state itself did not force them over certain moral 
boundaries. Although they had to deploy liberation stories in public, despite rejecting 
them in private, this was not seen as a compromise. Rather, because the idea of the 
antifascist struggle and liberation had become meaningless, it could be publicly stated 
without implying that one was in league with the State or was accepting its version of 
the past. It was simply the banal iteration of politically empty terms. In the above 
quote, Ágota described how she now categorised the term „felszabadulás/ liberation‟ 
to be a word such as ‟drink‟ or ‟table‟ – it had no political content for her anymore. 
The fact that she could use it so easily and not find this morally problematic indicated, 
for her, the extent of the political distance she had put between herself and the regime. 
As such, some considered the ease with which they themselves had deployed 
antifascist slogans unproblematically to be an expression of resistance, not of 
compromise. It signalled that they now inhabited an entirely different moral world 
and had completely rejected the antifascist universe in which the Communist state 
operated.  
 
Many also recognised that the state, wanting to re-integrate them, had not pushed 
them into making some difficult or impossible moral compromises. The Kádár regime 
had made nuanced judgements about their citizens‟ moral boundaries, and did not 
force them to step over them in their public biographies; whilst requiring the use of 
terms such as „liberation‟, more recent politically-charged terms such as „counter-
revolution‟ did not need to be iterated in public. Indeed, increasingly from 1963 
onwards, the Kádár regime used the term „counter-revolution‟ less and less in public, 
although it remained the official state history. Rather than refer to the events of the 
revolution itself, they increasingly demonised the revolution by referring back to their 
own condemnation of the uprising; this tactic allowed the regime to propagate its 
official position on the events of 1956 without publicly discussing the events 
themselves, which they feared might evoke a political reaction (Gyáni 2006).
13
 Only 
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 This practice of referring to the suppression of the „counter-revolution‟ indirectly also explains the 
absence of a memorial to the „Soviet heroes‟ of 1956 in the Kádár period. Commemorations of the 
„counter-revolution‟ were held every November 4th at the World War Two monument that celebrated 
in the 1980s was the idea of counter-revolution aggressively re-asserted (Ripp 2002, 
pp.240-5). Csaba explained how this distinction between the „official use‟ of „counter-
revolution‟ on one hand, and the everyday ways of describing 1956 on the other 
which were in fact tolerated from ordinary citizens and preferred by Kádár‟s 
supporters too: 
 
James:  Did you talk with your friends about 1956? 
 
Csaba: Yes, we all expressed the same opinion. For 
example, the party had a concept after 1956 of 
„counter-revolution‟, which meant that it was all 
the bourgeoisie, Fascists, the West, reaction; then 
there was „revolution‟, that meant the socialists. 
Now, I never uttered the word, „counter-
revolution‟, I didn‟t say it once after 1956, but it 
was possible to use the term the ‟56 events‟ in 
everyday speech. And all Hungarians understood 
what was meant. Nobody really ever said, 
„counter-revolution‟, that was just the official 
term. Neither did they say, „revolution‟, that was 
forbidden. They didn‟t want to say revolution and 
they [the regime‟s supporters] only said counter-
revolution within their families, but not openly. 
They said „the events of „56‟ too. This was the 
politically cautious waffle (óvatos mellébeszélés) 
that they used. 
 
Before 1956, antifascist life stories had been central to respondents‟ engagement with 
the state; by the mid-1960s, they had purged their lives of political meaning in order 
to sustain and justify a politically withdrawn existence. Not wanting to politically 
engage with a state that still employed antifascist rhetoric as its official discourse, 
many purged their private autobiographies of politicised stories of the antifascist 
struggle and liberation. The reconstruction of their life stories after 1956 was not 
moulded by new political concerns, but rather the wish to live a privatised, 
withdrawn, apolitical life. With their gradual re-integration into Communist society 
after 1963 respondents were prepared to manipulate their autobiographies in any way 
that ensured the protection of the private sphere from political intervention, even if 
this meant sacrificing the memories of involvement in 1956 or still repeating empty 
antifascist rhetoric in public where it was necessary to protect one‟s career. Many did 
not view these autobiographical manipulations as moral compromises or as a betrayal 
of the political struggles of their earlier lives, however. Indeed it was a symbol of the 
completeness of their personal depoliticisation and an indication of the extent of 
distance between themselves and the regime that they were so easily able to sacrifice 
the authenticity of their old political pasts in the empty spouting of state rhetoric. 
However, this was not how these manipulations were viewed after 1989; the 
stereotype of the careerist collaborating functionary who would sacrifice their own 
past for individual gain was to have a major impact of the way ex-party members 
                                                                                                                                            
liberation from Fascism instead. This compromise allowed „counter-revolutionaries‟ to be associated 
with Nazis, but ensured that the actual role of the Soviets in 1956 could be glossed over (Rév. 2005 , 
p.194). 
were viewed, and the ways they had to reshape their autobiographies, in the post-
Communist period. 
 
After 1989 
The collapse of Communism in 1989 ushered in significant changes in the way in 
which ex-Communist party members related their life stories. Many presented 
themselves as finally being able to tell stories about their pasts which had until then 
been taboo both in the home and in public. Stories about 1956 which had been 
repressed by the Kádár state could finally be articulated; stories of liberation and 
suffering under Fascism that had been co-opted by the Communist state could now be 
reclaimed, free from their previous associations with propaganda. Central to their new 
self-presentation was the idea of „truth-telling‟ about a once suppressed past.  
 
Whilst it is certainly the case that many suppressed stories did emerge, we should not 
take this claim to truth-telling at face value. On one hand, the idea of truth telling is 
frequently central to personal self-legitimation under any political system; to claim 
that one is recounting „historical realities‟ which were previously unacceptable can 
add authenticity to one‟s account of the past, and can often be used as a claim to 
social status in the present. This can be particularly powerful in post-dictatorial 
democratic systems, which claim to place a high value on ideals such as free speech. 
On the other hand, it was clear from respondents‟ testimony that the revival of certain 
political stories did not represent a simple resurgence of past experiences, unmediated 
by contemporary context. Their re-telling occurred in a very politicised environment; 
and narratives were shaped by new debates about the nature of Communism and the 
role of party members. Refashioning their life histories to deal with new approaches 
to the past was as important under post-Communism (Fitzpatrick, 2005) as it had been 
before 1956 or under the Kádár state. 
 
In 1989, aspects of their older antifascist life stories returned. They presented 
themselves as idealists radicalised by their suffering, or the suffering of others, under 
Fascism, who had been attracted to the Communist state out of sincere ideological 
conviction and the desire to contribute to the construction of a more progressive 
Hungary, who had been prepared to resist the power of the Communist state when it 
betrayed its initial promise, and who had suffered disproportionately after 1956 for 
their attempts to reform the Communist state.
14
 They contrasted themselves with those 
who joined the party after 1956, who they often considered to be non-ideological 
individualistic careerists. Many believed that their combination of experiences - their 
suffering under Fascism and Communism, their idealism (rather than careerism) and 
their preparedness to resist a degraded dictatorship would provide an acceptable 
account of their lives to a post-Communist audience. They wanted to demonstrate that 
there was an alternative and genuine antifascism, distinct from the Stalinist and 
Kádárist corruptions of the movement, which they considered to contain moral and 
political legacies worth preserving in the post-Communist period. However, they soon 
discovered that many did not accept the historical foundations upon which this 
supposedly moral account was based. Antifascism remained, after 1989, closely 
associated with the propagandistic rhetoric of the Communist regime. Moreover, 
newly dominant conservative historical scripts were attacking the entire edifice of 
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 This does not mean that all had morally pure life stories; rather that their believed their experiences 
could acceptably be turned into such a story. 
antifascism, destroying not only the Communist version of history but also the 
alternative antifascism through which respondents understood their lives and sought 
to be judged.  
 
The conservative historical accounts prevalent after 1989 demolished the historical 
context in which antifascism made sense. It both dislodged Fascism as the central 
defining evil of the 20
th
 century (replacing it with Communism) and removed the 
binary opposition between Fascism and Communism that was central to the antifascist 
framing of the world; rather, Fascism and Communism became viewed as very 
similar ideologies. Under the first conservative post-Communist government (1990-
4), the memory of Fascism was sidelined in the celebration of the pre-Communist 
period: the new government idealised pre-1945 conservative bourgeois Hungary 
under Horthy for its social stability, its maintenance of national traditions and its anti-
Communism (Rév 2005, pp.43-4).
15
 The Red Army and Soviets were demonised for 
destroying it. This interpretation marginalised the memory of the indigenous Fascist 
state which had come between the Horthy era and the arrival of the Soviets. It also 
ignored the antecedents of Fascism, and the Holocaust, which lay earlier in the Horthy 
period; it preferred to present the aspects of Horthy‟s rule which held the Holocaust at 
bay, rather than those which facilitated it.
16
 In downplaying the memory of Fascism 
and the Holocaust, this new historical narrative stripped the Red Army of any 
liberationist credentials, and divested the Communist party members‟ political 
radicalisation of any meaning or ideological justification. These early post-
Communist interpretations of history were often reproduced in conservatives‟ 
testimony: Fascism was of little consequence, and the Red Army were solely 
destroyers. Hence anyone who used the rhetoric of antifascism and liberation must 
have been a Communist stooge who later invented a politically convenient history for 
themselves: 
 
James : Did you use this word liberation (felszabadulás)? 
 
Márton: Only when forced to do so. There was a word 
play, because „dúlás‟ means „laying to waste‟, and 
here we had the Tartar-dúlás (tatárdúlás), the 
Turkish-dúlás (törökdúlás) and then the „felszaba-
dúlás’. In this sense I used it quite a lot. But 
really, at home, I never used it.  
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 Different post-Communist conservative leaders have utilised different aspects of the recent past. 
József Antall, the head of the first post-Communist conservative government from 1990, could not – 
unlike other post-Communist figures such as Walesa and Dubcek – present himself as a resistance 
hero. His father had played a significant role in the Horthy regime (Rainer, 2005), however, and it was 
to the sense of continuity between anti-Communist Horthy regime and post-Communist Hungary that 
he appealed. Viktor Orbán, leader of the conservative FIDESZ party and Prime Minister between 1998 
and 2002, referred much more to the conservative legacy of 1956; this was in part because he had 
established his political credentials demanding that the Soviets leave the country at Imre Nagy‟s 
reburial in 1989; hence his political reputation had been built on the back of the memory of 1956 
(Gyáni, 2006).  
16
 Horthy‟s regency saw the enactment of anti-Semitic legislation (from the early 1920s), the 
imposition of the Nuremberg Laws in Hungary, the creation of forced labour battalions for Jews, 
massacres of Jews following the annexation of Transylvania in 1941, and eventually the deportation of 
Jews to concentration camps after the occupation of Hungary by the German army; however, Hungary 
under Horthy also remained the one of the safest countries in Europe for Jews fleeing deportation until 
March 1944. Rather than allude to a mixed legacy, conservatives tended to stress the latter point alone.  
 James : Did you meet anybody, in whose opinion, it was a 
felszabadulás? 
 
Márton:  Loads. I met with lots of narrow-minded 
Communists: these were abnormally exaggerated 
people. I knew these kinds of Communists and I 
heard the speeches they made that would make 
your hair stand on end. Like when the leader of 
the local organisation of the Workers‟ Party was 
winding up and he said now we must sing the 
„Imperialism‟. He said it instead of the 
„Internationale‟. The other, at a peace rally, there 
was priest sitting in the front row in his cassock, 
and the workers‟ leader said, we warmly greet our 
comrades here present and we also greet with 
great affection our dear representative of „clerical 
reaction‟. Naturally it was very funny, they 
laughed in his face, but I knew these people, who 
got in with the party organisation.  
 
Other interpretations did more than just sideline Fascism; they also attempted to 
replace Communism for Fascism as the defining terror regime of the 20
th
 century. The 
Black Book of Communism, which some critics argue was written not only to establish 
the extent of Communist terror, but also to establish that the victims of Communism 
outnumbered those of Fascism (Kuromiya 2001, p.195)
17
 - was frequently mentioned 
by conservative respondents as their favourite work on Communism. The 
downplaying of the evils of Fascism, and the new emphasis on the terrors of 
Communism, served not only to remove the context in which party members‟ political 
journey could be understood, but also functioned to present them primarily as 
collaborators with a terror state. When asked about Fascism by a western interviewer, 
conservatives sometimes questioned western obsessions with Fascism, and suggested 
instead that Communism and Communists were the greater evil: 
  
Kálmán:  It is interesting that people in the west think that 
they have to judge Fascism, but not Communism. 
What sort of logic is this? Communism had many 
more victims than Fascism....One hears all the 
time about the Holocaust now. It would have been 
possible to talk about it for ten or twenty years 
after the war, but nobody talked about it. Now 
everybody talks about it. One has to ask, why? 
Why? Why is it necessary to drag all this up 
again? ...For forty years nobody was bothered 
about it… And Hungarian victims, who were 
victims of Communism, are they worth nothing? 
They say there were twenty million victims of 
                                                 
17. He argued that “Courtois‟ attempt to present communism as a greater evil than nazism by playing a 
numbers game is a pity because it threatens to dilute the horror of the actual killings.” (Kuromiya 2001, 
p.195) 
Communism
18
...Fascism did not produce as many 
victims as Communism. 
 
Whereas some conservative accounts demonised Communism by presenting it as 
worse than Fascism, others stigmatised it through the direct equating of the two 
systems. Whereas antifascism had presented history as a struggle between Fascism 
and Communism, some post-Communist accounts presented these ideologies not as 
binary opposites but rather philosophical twins. Drawing on totalitarian ideas that had 
developed in the western world since the 1950s (Gleason, 1995, pp.211-16), they 
rejected the opposing ideological aspirations of these two ideologies – such as their 
different ideas about race, class and nation - as unimportant in favour of a perspective 
which stressed their common tendency towards dictatorship and violence. The Fascist 
and Communist periods were also equated as eras of occupation; some new narratives 
envisaged a period of continuous Fascist and Communist occupation from March 
1944 to 1989 (Rév 2005, p.44, Rainer 2003, p.230). Rather than addressing the 
different respects in which these two occupations affected the country, they were both 
seen as systems which took away Hungary‟s independence and subordinated the 
nation to wider empires. With the close association of these two systems established, 
and their ideological opposition erased, the decision of some to become Fascists out 
of a fear of Communism, or of others to convert to Communism after their experience 
of Fascism, became less comprehensible. This direct equating of the two systems was 
manifested in the stories conservatives told about Arrow Cross members who became 
Communists. Although such people existed after the war, it is more interesting in this 
context that conservatives found this story so appealing; it illustrated for them that 
there was a type of person who was attracted to revolutionary violent dictatorial 
movements, and hence suggested that Communism and Fascism were in some ways 
ideological bedfellows.
19
 When János was asked about his experiences of the Arrow 
Cross in the autumn of 1944, he used the opportunity to draw links between their 
membership, and behaviour, and that of the Communist state security forces that 
followed after the war. Communism was demonised by linking its party members 
with Fascism and the Holocaust:  
 
János:  It was the darkest time [under the Arrow Cross], 
with unfortunate consequences. I was in Budapest 
and I only know this from hearing about it. 
Magyaróvár was under Arrow Cross rule, and they 
were terrorising and rounding up the Jews, and 
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 His interpretation is clearly moulded by the Black Book of Communism‟s focus on counting the 
number of victims in order to judge Communism. This is the figure the Black Book gives for deaths 
attributable to Communist rule in the Soviet Union, and includes not only state-sanctioned killings, but 
also deaths in the Gulag, through famine and those indirectly caused. It is interesting that he referred to 
a figure for deaths outside Hungary to make his point; despite only lasting for approximately eight 
months (and Communism just over four decades), Fascist rule in Hungary led to a far greater loss of 
human life (including over 500,000 Hungarian Jews) than the Communist regime did.  
19
 This interpretation is also manifested at the conservative „House of Terror‟ museum in Budapest; the 
linking space between the exhibitions on the Fascist and Communist periods is called ‟Changing 
Clothes‟. The room contains cloakroom lockers; two mannequins back to back, one dressed in the 
uniform of an Arrow Cross and one in the garb of a Communist, which spin around; and Rákosi‟s 
statement, „Sometime unfortunately we admit Fascists into our party‟ printed in large text on the wall. 
Party members, it is suggested, can merely slip on a new uniform and turn from Fascists into 
Communists.  
those who sympathised with the Jews, and those 
who weren‟t sympathetic to the German 
occupation. These arrests, this harassment, went 
on day by day. Really it was rather like those 
times at the beginning of the 1950s, when the 
ÁVH
20
 did this kind of thing. The Communists 
did it later, but at this point it was the Arrow 
Cross Fascists. I can say that really lots of Arrow 
Cross members became Communists, then later 
did exactly the same thing.  
 
Faced with these stereotypes, ex-party members had to consider how to reconstruct a 
life story that would be believable, compelling, and morally acceptable to a post-
Communist audience. They therefore accentuated the authenticity of their antifascism 
distinct from the negative associations of the corrupted version of the late Communist 
state. They erased memories of how they had used antifascist stories in the 
achievement of ambitions, as this would make them appear to be ideologically 
inauthentic functionaries; rather, they concentrated on aspects of the antifascist story 
which demonstrated that their support for Communism was born out of genuine 
suffering, and which emphasised that an antifascist tradition was as much about anti-
regime resistance as it was about identification with the Communist state.  
 
Respondents tried to make their attraction to the Communism comprehensible by  
re-establishing authentic personally-grounded accounts of Fascism and liberation that 
were distinctive from the antifascist rhetoric that of the Communist state. One 
respondent was horrified that it was as socially unacceptable to call the arrival of the 
Red Army a liberation in post-Communist society, as it had been politically unwise to 
deny the liberation during the Communist period. He believed that this was in part 
because many Hungarians had not themselves suffered under Fascism, and that 
general ignorance of the experiences of the Jews and left-wingers permitted the 
conclusion that liberation was only a myth promulgated by the Communist state. He 
distanced his account of antifascism and liberation from that favoured during the 
Communist period by acknowledging the validity of the alternative view of the Red 
Army as an occupying force. Through a story comparing his own genuine experience 
of liberation by the Soviets in 1944 with the suffering endured by peasants whose 
grain was requisitioned by the Red Army soldiers, he sought to be seen as a balanced, 
unpoliticised and objective historical voice. In being prepared to acknowledge other 
people‟s experience of occupation, he hoped his audience might in turn recognize the 
authenticity of his personal experience of liberation and permit public discussion of 
1944-5 as such:  
 
James:  Is it difficult to speak about a ‘felszabadulás’ 
today? 
 
Jenő: Today is much more difficult, because society 
violently denies that it was a liberation and attacks 
the idea. I naturally approve of the fact that it is no 
longer obligatory to call 1945 a liberation, as it 
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 Az Államvédelmi Hatóság (literally, State Protection Authority), existed 1950-1956. 
was under the Communist regime. But saying 
liberation shouldn‟t be forbidden, or made almost 
impossible to say. Here it is a real problem, 
because the Jews and the left wingers felt it was a 
felszabadulás as the arrival of the Russians and 
their driving out of the Germans made life much 
easier, because danger to one‟s life or the danger 
of losing one‟s freedom ended. [But] a large part 
of the population didn‟t experience it like that. 
 
At the beginning of 1945 I went to Szeged [a town 
in south east Hungary] with my brothers and 
sisters, because there was nothing to eat in 
Budapest and my parents had not come home, and 
we had relatives in Szeged and we lived there for 
a few weeks at the beginning of 1945, we went 
there immediately after the liberation. There was 
food there, we went to school…and my younger 
brother who wasn‟t in Szeged anymore. He was in 
Hódmezővásárhely and I went to visit him there. 
The Soviets had blown up the bridge and you had 
to travel by ferry and the ferrymen said, „davaj‟ 
[Russian for „Give it Here‟], and then a great 
number of the peasant women recited a verse, 
„davaj davaj, nem volt tavaly, jobb volt tavaly, 
nem volt davaj‟ [„Give it here, Give it here!‟, we 
didn't have this last year, it was better last year, 
we didn't have „Give it here!‟]. And at that time it 
strongly hit me, that then I understood, that for 
them it had been better the last year, when for me 
it had been a nightmare. The last year-1944- had 
been a terrible year [for me], but for them 1945 
was the terrible year. Then I understood and I 
realised that although it was a liberation for the 
intelligentsia, it wasn‟t really like this for the 
peasants. 
 
To make these personal accounts believable, some respondents recognised the need 
for a new type of antifascist language that did not remind other Hungarians of 
Communist propaganda, but rather evoked sympathy for their personal suffering of 
the left and Jews. In reviving the story of his „liberation‟, which he had suppressed 
during the Kádár era for fear of confirming a degraded antifascist script, one 
respondent characterised Soviet troops no longer as „liberators‟ but rather „life-
savers‟: 
 
James:  Do you remember when you heard that the 
Russian army was getting close to Budapest? 
 
Mátyás: We were overjoyed. It‟s absolutely clear. There 
wasn‟t any type of ideology or political 
requirement [to say it]. The liberators came (jöttek 
a felszabadítók), but today this has become a 
worn-out phrase, so now one can say, „the 
lifesavers came‟ (jöttek az életmentők). If 
somebody is drowning in water, if somebody 
throws them a life-ring, then you don‟t think about 
the ideological basis on which they threw it to 
you; it‟s that simple. The Arrow Cross wanted to 
wipe us out, they wanted to slaughter us, the 
Russians came, they saved our lives. 
 
In addition, in order to make their story compelling, they had to challenge the post-
Communist downgrading of Fascism and wholesale demonisation of the Red Army.  
Zsolt placed Fascism at the centre of his wartime stories in order to counter the 
„younger generation‟s‟ ignorance of it, and, through stories of his own personal 
experience, tried to refute the prevalent idea that the Red Army was nothing more 
than a violent atrocity-committing occupier (Mark 2005a). Only through re-
establishing the importance of Fascism and their experience of the Red Army as 
liberators could respondents make their attraction to the Communist party 
comprehensible: 
 
Zsolt :  Your generation can‟t even imagine how these 
times were in Fascist countries… They [war 
leaders] were Fascists - simply Fascists. There 
was here and there an exception like Endre 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and a large boulevard in 
Budapest is named after him… An Arrow Cross 
member was standing in an entrance in our street, 
out in front of the gate. I went out and he stopped 
me. I said, „yes?‟ And he said, machine gun at the 
ready, at me, „papers!‟ or „identification‟ or 
something. And I said, „yes‟. And then in the 
fraction of a second I thought how clever I am that 
I have this pistol here, in the jacket, instead of the 
usual place. And the second dreadful thought was 
that these Frommels, unlike some modern pistols 
where the first bullet is already in the tube, didn‟t 
have a security lock. For the first bullet you have 
to pull back the catch which fires it, and this thing 
gives a very characteristic click, so I thought, „I 
am finished‟. He will pull the trigger at once when 
he hears it. So I tried successfully to do the 
following thing. I did this – „papers?‟ „yes‟- 
(coughs loudly) - I coughed to suppress the click, 
and fired at once…that‟s the story.  
 
James:  So do you remember when you first heard the 
Russians were coming close to Budapest?  
 
Zsolt :  …the canon fire was very audible all over 
Budapest for days and days…when the first 
Russian appeared at the gate of Szív utca we were 
very happy. And the innumerable stories about the 
Russians soldiers, who raped everybody….not a 
word is true. They behaved like soldiers behave 
after they take a town which was defended street 
by street, metre by metre, and they too had 
suffered heavy losses, so they were not in the best 
of moods. But, and, it was a matter of course in 
everybody eyes that sporadic cases of 
misbehaviour happened. Rapes too. But these 
cases were very few considering for instance what 
the other armies did in the Soviet Union or 
elsewhere. And they weren't vandals. All they 
wanted was your wrist watch. Well, we all had 
wrist watches and nobody took it [from us]. But 
they had a taste for it, for asking for your wrist 
watch. But they didn‟t behave brutally. Anyway, 
the Russians were all right…  
 
By calling for a greater awareness of the variety of experiences of Fascism and the 
Red Army, an increasing knowledge of the impact of Fascism amongst the new post-
Communist generation - by undermining conservative ideas about Red Army 
occupation and by trying to invent a new language to describe these events, distinct 
from the degraded antifascism of the late Communist state - respondents hoped to 
garner sympathy for, and an understanding of, their radicalisation to left-wing politics. 
They wanted to make it clear that their experience of Fascism led to Communism, and 
that their antifascist stories were not later inventions of the Communist period. This 
required not only the recreation of the context of their political radicalisation, but also 
the repression of the memory of the politically correct versions of their antifascist 
histories some created after 1948 in order to advantage themselves under the 
Communist system. This might expose them to the charge of being ideologically 
inauthentic careerists. It is striking that ex-Communist party members almost never 
referred to the process of polishing their antifascist biographies between 1948 and 
1956 (in order to achieve professional or political ambitions); yet these stories were 
often mentioned by non-Communists as necessary inventions in order to get on in the 
system (Mark 2005b).
21
  
 
Central to constructing an authentic antifascism in the post-Communist period was the 
story of resistance to the early Communist state, and, in particular, involvement in the 
1956 revolution. In a post-Communist context it was important for respondents to 
establish the idea that antifascist language might be used to express opposition to 
Communist practice; that antifascist ideas did not necessarily signify uncritical 
support, or a preparedness to iterate unquestioningly the state‟s politicised version of 
the past. In addition, some respondents wanted to use resistance stories to legitimise 
some aspects of the Communist tradition, highlighting the validity of the tradition of 
                                                 
21
 Ex-party members did admit to manipulating their antifascist biographies for personal gain, but only 
after 1956 when they no longer supported the party, led depoliticised lives, and had stopped being 
concerned about moral integrity when instrumentalising their political pasts.  
reformed socialism distinct from the „degraded‟ forms of Stalinism and Kádárism 
experienced by the Hungarian population. However, after 1989, many ex-party 
members were shocked to discover that the stories of revolutionary involvement they 
had repressed during the Kádár period, and felt able to articulate after 1989, were now 
violently attacked from a new direction: the post-Communist right. 
 
James:  Are there debates about 1956 today? 
 
Jenő:  Of course, there are debates again. But now we 
are not primarily debating whether it was a 
counter-revolution, but now they [i.e. right-
wingers] want to falsify other things. Before 1989, 
the Kádár system presented it as a counter-
revolution – now the right describes the revolution 
in just about the same way, but for them this is not 
a negative but rather a positive sign. They say it 
was an anti-Bolshevik, anti-socialist revolution 
and everyone wanted to go back to before 1945 to 
the Horthy era... They say that we call ourselves 
reform Communists, and they say that we weren‟t 
really on the side of the revolution, we really 
remained true Communists and we only wanted to 
change things just a bit in the interests of the 
Communist system. According to them, we didn‟t 
have a role in the revolution; only we believed 
that we had a leading role.  
 
Reform Communists were faced with the charge that they were, in essence, 
collaborators with the system; their acts of resistance were viewed as unimportant 
tinkerings at the margins. The post-Communist right, who viewed Communism per se 
(rather than just the Stalinist variant) as illegitimate, and as an occupation, argued that 
only those who attempted to end the Communist regime and eject the Soviet presence 
were real revolutionaries. Thus the reform Communists‟ roles in the revolution were 
played down, and other political traditions‟ involvement, particularly those on the 
right, were emphasised (Nyyssönen, 1999, p.248; Litván 2002, p.263). In post-
Communist conservative accounts, reform Communists cannot be vaunted without 
first being stripped of their political identity. Thus when conservatives celebrated the 
role of Imre Nagy after 1989, his Communist past and political beliefs during the 
revolution were usually sidelined in favour of remembering his execution in 1958; he 
was transformed from the representative of reformed socialist resistance against 
Stalinism to a politically decontextualised symbol of the violence of Communist 
dictatorship (Rév 2005, pp.84-8).
22
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 This is the approach used in the House of Terror museum. Imre Nagy features most heavily in the 
room on Communist justice (as an illustration of the absence of it in his 1958 trial), but is not present in 
the exhibition room which deals with the uprising itself. Indeed, the museum sites 1956 and its 
aftermath not within the main two floors of the museum which provide a narrative of Hungarian history 
from 1944 to c.1958, but in a dark basement room between the reconstructed prison cells of the secret 
police and the „Hall of Tears‟ (which commemorates the victims of Communism). This placement 
suggests that 1956 is not being remembered for its specific political aims but has become historically 
decontextualised to operate merely as a symbol for the Communist victimisation of the nation. Such an 
 In the political transition in 1989, the memory of the revolution played a pivotal role; 
the renaming of 1956 from a „counter-revolution‟ to a ‟popular uprising‟ came to 
symbolise the decline in legitimacy of the Kádár regime and the beginning of a new 
political order. In the years which immediately followed, political debates over 1956 
died down, and it became a relatively politically neutral topic (Rainer 2002, 257). In 
the mid-1990s, however, the memory of the revolution began to be instrumentalised 
by both left and right: particular interpretations of the uprising were foregrounded by 
different groups in order to validate their political programmes in the present. In 1994, 
the first leftist post-Communist government commemorated the role of reformed 
socialist Imre Nagy. This was on the one hand an attempt to embrace 1956 for the 
post-Communist left, but was also interpreted as making amends for Prime Minister 
Gyula Horn‟s role in opposing the revolution in 1956 itself.23 The post-Communist 
right - in particular the party of Fidesz under Viktor Orbán - framed 1956 as a fight 
both for freedom and for a „bourgeois Hungary‟; a struggle that only came to a close 
with the stewardship of the Fidesz government in the late 1990s (Rainer 2003, 
pp.218-9). They stressed the role of bourgeois interests in the revolution, such as 
religious conservatives (Litván 2002, p.261).
24
 Conservatives have also demonised 
alternative interpretations; in 1996, Fidesz‟s party literature marginalised reform 
socialists‟ role when discussing the revolution; they were placed alongside Stalinists 
as merely two different types of „jailers‟ (börtönőrök) (Litván, 2002, p.263).25 Whilst 
respondents felt themselves attacked over their role in the uprising, they also realised 
that the post-Communist obsession with resistance and 1956 gave them space in the 
public sphere to explain the relationship between antifascism and opposition.  
  
These debates have not only given these respondents the opportunity to air their 
stories, but also have shaped their form. Károly had silenced his revolutionary 
involvement in the Kádár period; his revived revolutionary stories were now moulded 
by the political divides and tone of contemporary debates. Respondents often used 
their stories to present themselves, and their political tradition, as the true 
representatives of the revolution, and to marginalise the role of other groups. Reacting 
against conservative characterisations of ex-party members as collaborators incapable 
of proper resistance, Károly framed the key participants in 1956 as antifascist reform 
socialists, and argued that the right had played a negative role in the revolution. 
Firstly, he accused conservatives such as Cardinal Mindszenty of sabotaging the 
revolution by expressing a desire to return to the traditions of pre-1945 Hungary in his 
speech of November 3
rd
 1956, and thus almost being responsible for provoking the 
retribution of the state and Soviet tanks. By implication, the revolution was much 
safer in reformed socialist hands, whose aims – the creation of a more democratic 
socialism - were more limited, but might almost have been achieved without right-
wing provocation. Secondly, he associated the right‟s role in the uprising with 
                                                                                                                                            
approach makes it easier to write Imre Nagy‟s politics, and the reform socialist tradition, out of the 
historical narrative.  
23
 It is striking that even though the left has mobilised figures such as Imre Nagy, but other leftist 
political movements of the revolution, such as the Workers‟ Councils, have become unfashionable with 
the decline in leftist working-class culture and are now seldom mentioned.  
24
 According to Orbán, “October 23rd bequeathed to us the inheritance of national independence, 
freedom and bourgeois democracy, November 4
th
 however gave us the traditions of treason, terror and 
dictatorship” (Litván, 2002, p.261). 
25
 ‟A Polgári Magyarországért. „Két pogány közt egy hazáert.” A Fidesz Magyar Polgári Párt vitairata‟. 
2. kiad. Budapest 1996. Fidesz Országos Elnöksége-Fidesz Központi Hivatal (Litván, 2002 p.263).  
extremism, and violence against Hungarian citizens; in a striking final twist to his 
story, he used his arrest by the Soviet-backed new regime on November 4
th
 1956 to 
demonise not Communism but the far right whom he had expected were much more 
likely to arrest him: 
 
Károly:  On October 23
rd
, when the revolution broke out in 
Budapest, then with my friend and one other 
personal we went to party headquarters…There 
was a very broad political palette on display - 
from Imre Nagy to the extreme right – but right to 
the end I was on the left of the revolution. I still 
believed in socialism, but it didn‟t have to be done 
in the way it was being done, it could have been 
reformed. Ours was the biggest, more threatening 
form of resistance, and, interestingly, those who 
attacked [the system] from within were always the 
most dangerous. We got information about how to 
set up a new left-wing party, and in only an hour 
and a half we started our discussions. We were in 
a rather optimistic mood…in the afternoon we 
received a working-class delegation from Miskolc 
and we went and saw Imre Nagy with them. That 
meeting was alarming, because the old man was 
clearly uninformed and incapable of doing 
anything…It was November 1st when we went 
back to our town and set up a new party 
organisation. 
 
… We were shocked by Mindszenty‟s speech26, 
even today I have a very poor opinion of him. 
Certainly his trial was illegal, but I considered him 
to be a habitual, consistent reactionary – much 
more than just a conservative – who hurt us [i.e. 
the revolutionaries] a lot in 1956. Of course even 
without him the revolution would have come to an 
end, but he really harmed the revolutionary 
movement…  
 
We were sharply anti-Soviet, and when they 
suddenly the Soviets came back…on 4th 
November, at dawn, I was woken at my flat and 
there appeared some civilian police with sub-
machine guns. At that time, I didn‟t know that the 
Russians had come back; they came in and they 
took me away. I believed that extreme right-wing 
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 In his radio address of 3
rd
 November 1956, Cardinal Mindszenty, following his release from prison, 
refuted the idea that 1956 was a revolution, preferring to characterise it as a „fight for freedom‟ to re-
establish the historical traditions which had been broken by the arrival of the Red Army in 1945. This 
conservative platform was rejecting not just Communism, but also the progressive, democratic system 
which had emerged between 1945 and 1948.  
elements had come [to my flat], because the 
revolution had become divided, because there 
were those, who were strongly anti-Communist. 
Because I stood on a socialist platform, they 
didn‟t like it. Only when I was inside the police 
station did it turn out that this was not the case; 
rather the old regime had come back and they 
wanted to execute me. The leader of our county 
informed my wife, that they would execute me, 
and then, after I had sat there for a bit, they 
transferred me to prison and there began my time 
inside.
27
 
 
In the 1990s, ex-party members sought to make their life stories socially acceptable to 
a new post-Communist audience. Shocked to find that the antifascist and 
revolutionary stories they had silenced during the Kádár era were now being attacked 
by the post-Communist right, they searched for new ways to legitimise their life 
stories. Rejecting the stereotype of self-interested collaborator, they drew on earlier 
stories from their pre-1956 political lives in order to refashion themselves as idealistic 
leftists whose antifascist beliefs had led them not just to support the Communist state, 
but also to resist it. They used their personal stories to fend off the marginalisation of 
Fascism and their roles in the 1956 revolution which were central to sustaining this 
narrative. The revival of their stories was thus not simply the resurgence of stories lost 
during Kádárism, but rather an older life story re-modelled for a post-Communist 
audience. 
 
Post-war Communist party members lived through three distinct political 
environments, in each of which the content and form of their autobiographies changed 
and served different functions. In the early Communist period, individuals‟ political 
attitudes and practices determined the types of autobiographies they created: 
respondents constructed antifascist life histories to show support and articulate their 
identification with public histories and the state that produced them; to express 
resistance where they felt the promise of antifascism to have been betrayed; but also 
to communicate their ambitions through the production of politically advantageous 
life narratives that would benefit them in education, career or the party structures. 
After the defeat of the 1956 uprising and the reprisals that followed, many individuals 
decided to withdraw from a political life; they would neither support nor resist the 
Kádár state. Consequently their life stories altered and the antifascist stories which 
had been central to their political identities were abandoned. When provided with the 
opportunity to reintegrate into Communist society after 1962 individuals were 
concerned to protect their private and family worlds from their political pasts. When 
constructing their life stories, respondents were no longer concerned with issues of 
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 It was striking that respondents from a variety of political traditions reproduced, in the post-
Communist period, aspects of the Kádár-era conception of 1956 as a counter-revolution intent on 
restoring a bourgeois „reactionary‟ state to Hungary. Conservative respondents used it positively to 
suggest that the revolution was intent on re-establishing a bourgeois Hungary, and that reformed 
socialists played only a minor role. Reformed socialists (such as Károly above) used the threat of the 
right-wing restoration in the revolution to suggest that the right had sabotaged the reform process by 
inviting the Stalinists to suppress the revolution. Supporters of the Kádár system still produce counter-
revolutionary rhetoric in the post-Communist testimony.  
political or moral integrity and were prepared to manipulate the retelling of their 
experiences to safeguard their private, apolitical lives. After the collapse of 
Communism, they were forced to rethink again. Confronted with conservative 
nationalist voices which demonised them as careerist collaborators, ex-party members 
revived their anti-fascist stories. They did this now not to demonstrate their support 
for the Communist state but rather to construct a principled story that they hoped 
would make their lives morally acceptable for a post-Communist audience. The 
creation of autobiography has thus played three different roles in their lives: to engage 
politically, to defend the private sphere against the state and to reassert moral status in 
the face of an ideologically hostile society. 
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